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Countries that wish to erect trade barriers have a variety of instruments at their dis-
posal. In addition to taris and quotas, countries can oer tax relief, low interest nancing,
reduced regulation, and other subsidies to domestic industries facing foreign competition.
In a trade agreement, countries typically agree to reduce not only taris, but also subsidies.
We consider the eect of a trade agreement on pollution emissions. We show that while
reducing taris may indeed increase pollution intensive production in a country, reductions
in some subsides required by the trade agreement reduce pollution in general equilibrium
for reasonable parameter values. The reduction results from two eects. First, a reduction
in subsidies to rms reduces pollution-causing capital accumulation. Second, if subsidized
rms, industries, and/or state owned enterprises are suciently more pollution intensive,
then reducing subsides moves capital and labor from more to less pollution intensive rms.
We then calibrate the model to China in 1997, which is prior to implementing the reforms
specically required by the US-China World Trade Organization (WTO) Bilateral Agree-
ment. Our model predicts that pollution emissions in China are up to 22.9% lower than a
baseline in which China does not enter the WTO, without any pollution abatement policy
changes or environmental side agreements.1 Introduction
Countries that wish to erect trade barriers have a variety of instruments at their disposal. In
addition to taris and quotas, countries can oer tax relief, low interest nancing, reduced
regulation, and other subsidies to domestic industries facing foreign competition. The politi-
cal process is unlikely to produce a uniform tari. Instead, countries with high trade barriers
employ a complex mixture of all these instruments, resulting in signicant distortions. In a
trade agreement, countries typically agree to reduce not only taris, but also subsidies. For
example, subsidies to exporting industries violate WTO rules.1
The main claim of our paper is that reductions in domestic subsidies implied by some
trade agreements have signicant eects on pollution emissions. These eects are associated
with a country's opening to trade and, therefore, cannot be ignored when considering the
eects of trade agreements on pollution. Indeed, we give conditions for which reducing
subsidies to comply with a trade agreement causes pollution to fall. The pollution reduction
results from two eects. First, a reduction in subsidies to industry reduces pollution-causing
capital accumulation. Second, if heavily subsidized rms, industries, and/or state owned
enterprises (SOEs) are suciently more pollution intensive, then reducing subsides moves
capital and labor from more to less pollution intensive rms.
Empirical evidence exists which shows our conditions are reasonable. Wang and Jin
(2002) nd that SOEs in China are more pollution intensive (by up to a factor of 10). Wang,
Mamingi, Laplante, and Dasgupta (2002) nd that one reason is that large, politically con-
nected SOEs enjoy lax enforcement of environmental regulations. In our most conservative
calibration, our main condition is satised for three of four pollutants studied by Wang and
Jin (2002).
Thus even if world tari reductions cause pollution-intensive production to increase in
a country, overall pollution may still fall because the tari eect is more than oset by the
reduction in pollution caused by the reduction in subsidies. Indeed, we calibrate the model
1Specically, subsides specic to an individual or group of rms, products, or industries which are either
contingent on export performance (\prohibited") or have adverse eects on member industries (\actionable")
are not allowed. Member countries may bring suit to have such subsidies removed or be allowed to retaliate.
See Annex 1A, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the WTO's legal document on the
Uruguay Round Agreements.
1to China in 1997 and nd that, after reducing subsidies required by the WTO agreement,
the equilibrium path of total suspended particulates (TSP) in our model converges over time
to a steady state 17.6% lower than a baseline economy in which no subsidies are reduced.
Similarly, steady state chemical oxygen demand (COD) is 7.6% lower, and sulfur dioxide
(SO2) is 22.9% lower (total suspended solids, TSS, rise by 0.5%). The reduction in pollution
occurs without any environmental side agreements or abatement policy changes.
There is a large theoretical literature on free trade and the environment.2 Following
Copeland and Taylor (2004) and others, we denote the idea that a reduction in trade bar-
riers causes pollution intensive production to shift from countries with relatively stringent
regulation to countries with relatively weak regulation the pollution haven hypothesis.3 A
competing theory, the factor endowment hypothesis says that since pollution is capital in-
tensive, reducing trade barriers should cause pollution intensive industries to move to the
more capital intensive country, usually the more developed country.
Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001) decompose the eect of reducing trade barriers
on pollution into scale, composition, and technique eects familiar from the Environmental
Kuznets Curve literature (Grossman and Krueger 1995). Reducing trade barriers causes out-
put to rise, which increases pollution (the scale eect). However, the increase in income also
results in increased abatement spending, reducing pollution (the technique eect). Finally,
a reduction in trade frictions causes the country exporting the dirty good to specialize in
that good, increasing pollution (the composition eect).
Our results can be interpreted in a similar way. As in Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor
(2001), a scale eect exists in that reducing in trade barriers causes output to rise, which
increases pollution. Our model by assumption has no changes in abatement policy. Yet if
subsidies fall we still have technique eect. If subsidized rms are more pollution intensive,
then when production moves from the subsidized sector to the private sector, overall pollution
intensity falls. Our technique and scale eect can be combined into a relatively simple criteria
that determines whether or not pollution will rise or fall as subsidies fall. Our calibration to
2Survey papers include Kolstad and Xing (1996), Rauscher (2001), and Ulph (1997).
3That is, we are not considering the pollution haven eect, which deals with the eect of pollution
regulations on trade 
ows.
2China indicates this criteria is reasonable and indicates the technique eect is quite strong
in practice.
The literature on how subsidies to industry aect the environment is very sparse.4 Since
almost all countries have industrial policies which favor some industries, this lack of attention
is quite surprising. To understand pollution in such a setting requires a theory of rms and
industry structure in such economies. Bajona and Chu (2005) provide such a theory, which
we use here. Their industry structure consists of a private rm and a subsidized rm,
which they interpret as an SOE, perhaps facing foreign competition. Subsidized rms have
restrictions on the number of people they can lay o (Yin 2001), which we model as a
minimum labor requirement. In exchange, subsidized rms receive low interest loans from
the government or state owned banks (modeled as an interest rate subsidy) and receive direct
subsidies to cover the negative prots that result from the use of an inecient mix of capital
and labor. Finally, subsidized rms have lower total factor productivity (TFP) relative to
private sector rms. Thus, subsidized rms and private rms co-exist in equilibrium with
the share of production of subsidized rms determined endogenously by the subsidies, labor
requirements, and technology dierence.
Although the literature on subsidies and the environment is sparse, there is a related
empirical literature on SOEs and the environment. Wang and Jin (2002) nd SOEs in
China are more pollution intensive than private rms. In addition, Gupta and Saksena
(2002) nd that SOEs in India are monitored for environmental compliance less often than
private rms. Wang, Mamingi, Laplante, and Dasgupta (2002) nd that SOEs in China enjoy
more bargaining power over environmental compliance than private rms. Galiani, Gertler,
and Schargrodsky (2005) nd that privatization of water services in Argentina improved
health outcomes. However, Earnhart and Lizal (2002) nd an inverse relationship between
pollution intensity and percentage of state ownership among recently partially privatized
rms in the Czech Republic in their preferred model. The latter two studies focus on a
change in ownership, which does not necessarily imply a change in subsidies.5
4The only literature is on agricultural subsidies and the environment, see for example Antle, Lekakis, and
Zanias (1998).
5It is well known that recently privatized SOEs retain a close relationship to the state and thus possibly
their subsidies. A trade agreement is thus dierent than privatization in that the former reduces subsidies,
3We derive two conditions from several osetting eects that subsidies have on pollution.
The rst condition determines the eect of a reallocation of resources caused by subsidies on
pollution, which we call capital and labor resource reallocation eects. First, direct subsidies
raise equilibrium employment in subsidized rms, causing output to become more concen-
trated in subsidized rms. Second, the increase in employment causes capital to 
ow to the
subsidized sector, further concentrating output in subsidized rms. If subsidized rms are
more pollution intensive, these two eects cause pollution to increase. The third osetting
eect is that in equilibrium the marginal product of labor and capital are lower in the sub-
sidized sector. Thus direct subsidies reduce overall output and pollution by concentrating
labor and capital in the low-productivity subsidized sector. Our main condition requires the
rst two eects to be stronger.
In addition to the reallocation of resources, a capital accumulation eect exists in that
subsidies to rms directly increase overall demand for capital. However, the decline in overall
productivity caused by the concentration of capital in the subsidized sector tends to reduce
demand for capital. We show that the former eect is stronger so the return to capital rises,
causing the economy to over-accumulate capital, which causes pollution to rise over time
with subsidies.
Our results are also useful for the empirical literature on trade and the environment. Mani
and Wheeler (1997), Low and Yeats (1992), Ratnayake (1998), and others nd some evidence
in favor of the pollution haven hypothesis. These studies suer from lack of pollution data in
less developed countries, and so must instead classify industries according to their emissions
intensity in the US and then correlate output in pollution intensive industries to openness.
Our results show that indeed output in the dirty industry may rise following a reduction in
taris or subsidies, but because the reduction in subsidies causes production to shift to the
less pollution intensive private sector, overall (unmeasured) pollution may still fall.6
Our theoretical results are consistent with the empirical results of Birdsall and Wheeler
(1992) and Lucas, Wheeler, and Hettige (1992), who nd that pollution intensity is rel-
while the latter changes ownership.
6Copeland and Taylor (2004) discuss other possible cases where output rises but pollution falls as countries
reduce trade barriers.
4atively lower in more open economies. Our model suggests that the reason is that trade
agreements reduce subsidies to pollution intensive subsidized rms. These empirical results
are sometimes viewed as evidence against the pollution haven hypothesis, but our results
show that it is possible that a reduction in taris causes an increase in production of the
dirty good (the pollution haven hypothesis), but at the same time the reduction in subsidies
causes the overall pollution intensity to fall as production moves from dirty subsidized rms
to the cleaner private sector (consistent with more open countries having lower pollution
intensity). Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001) avoid these data problems by using data
on sulfur dioxide emissions from the Global Environmental Monitoring database. They also
nd a surprisingly strong technique eect, which is consistent with our numerical results
that reductions in subsidies results in a very strong technique eect.
2 A Theory of Pollution, Subsidies, and Trade
In this section, we consider a simplied version of the model in Bajona and Chu (2005) with
dierent pollution intensities for private and subsidized rms in order to derive some analytic
results on how subsidies aect pollution emissions. As such, the model is of independent
value as it provides a theory of pollution and industrial policy.
2.1 Firms
Private and subsidized rms dier in four aspects: productivity, pollution intensity, ability to
choose their labor input, and cost of capital. Productivity dierences are taken as exogenous,
with subsidized rms having TFP equal to AG, while private rms have TFP equal to AP.
Private and subsidized rms have access to the same constant returns to scale technology F.
We assume that subsidized rms are subject to a labor requirement equal to lG established
by the government. In exchange for keeping the level of employment, the government covers
any losses through direct subsidies. Given a binding labor constraint, subsidized rms use an
inecient mix of capital and labor and the earn negative prots. Subsidized and private rms
then co-exist if subsidized rms receive enough direct cash subsidies from the government to
5earn zero prots.7 Therefore, let S =  G be the direct subsidy, where G are the (negative)
prots of subsidized rms excluding the direct subsidy and G = G +S = 0 are the prots
including the direct subsidy. To save on notation, we suppress the time t subscripts where
no confusion is possible.
Let lP be the labor demand of the private sector. The representative household is endowed
with one unit of labor every period, which is supplied inelastically. Therefore, in equilibrium
lG + lP = 1.
Subsidized rms receive a second subsidy, a discount on their rental rate of capital, which
we call an interest subsidy. If we denote the rental rate of capital for private rms as r (in
terms of domestic goods), the rental rate of capital for subsidized rms is (1   s)r, where s
is the subsidy rate. This subsidy can be interpreted as either the government guaranteeing
repayment of funds borrowed by subsidized rms, SOEs borrowing at the government's
rate of interest, or as the government steering household deposits at state owned banks to
subsidized rms at reduced interest rates.8
The objective of both private and subsidized rms is to maximize prots taking prices
and government policies as given. If the subsidized rm is privately owned, then prot maxi-
mization is clearly reasonable. But even if the subsidized rm is state owned, evidence exists
for the idea that managers of SOEs are given incentives consistent with prot maximization.9
Our theory is not based on dierences in rm ownership, since whether households or rms
own the capital is irrelevant as long as all rms maximize prots. Instead, our theory is
based on the subsidies that rms with a close relationship to the state enjoy.
The problem of a subsidized rm consists of maximizing prots subject to the labor
requirement imposed by the government and the subsidy on capital:
G = max
KG
AGF (KG;lG)   (1   s)rKG   wlG: (2.1)
7In the absence of subsidies, in a competitive equilibrium only the rm with the highest TFP operates.
8The latter interpretation is more reasonable for developing countries. All three interpretations are
consistent with households renting capital.
9For China, Yin (2001) assume SOEs maximize prots, based on the results from Choe and Yin (2000).
However, we are ignoring agency issues and other problems associated with SOEs (see for example Gupta
2005, Shleifer and Vishny 1994).
6Here KG and KP are the parts of aggregate capital allocated to the subsidized and private
sectors, respectively, and K = KG + KP is the aggregate capital stock per person. Let
subscripts on functions denote partial derivatives. The rst order condition which determines
the part of the capital stock allocated to the subsidized sector is:
(1   s)r = APFk (KG;lG): (2.2)
The problem for private rms is standard:
P = max
KP;lP
APF (KP;lP)   rKP   wlP: (2.3)
The equilibrium rental rate and wage rate, w (also in domestic goods), are:
r = APFk (K   KG;1   lG); (2.4)
w = APFl (K   KG;1   lG): (2.5)
Let F be constant returns to scale in K and l, have positive and diminishing marginal
products, satisfy F (0;l) = F (K;0) = 0, and satisfy the Inada conditions in each input.
Then equations (2.2), (2.4), and (2.5) have a unique solution KG (K;AG=AP (1   s);lG),
r(K;AG=AP (1   s);lG), and w(K;AG=AP (1   s);lG). The labor constraint is binding
(subsidized rms hire more labor than is ecient) if and only if w > AGFl (KG;lG). If
subsidized rms hire less labor than is ecient, they make positive prots and the direct
subsidy is a tax. Since this case is not interesting, we assume the constraint binds. A
sucient condition for the constraint to bind is:10
(1   s)AP > AG: (2.6)
10For a Cobb-Douglas production function, w > AGFl (KG;lG) if and only if (1   s)
 AP > AG, where 
is the capital share.




























> 0 , condition (2.6): (2.9)
Apparently, a decrease in the interest subsidy rate implies a reallocation of capital from
the subsidized sector to the private sector. Further, a decrease in the interest subsidy rate
decreases the total demand for capital, hence the interest rate must fall to bring demand
for capital back up to the supply. Similarly, a fall in the demand for capital implies a lower
demand for labor as well so the wage rate must also fall. This simple intuition drives many
of the results in the paper. Although a fall in the labor requirement will cause labor to move
from the subsidized sector the private sector by denition, it is not immediate that the wage
rate falls. Instead, the fall in the labor requirement causes the subsidized sector to reduce
demand for capital as well. If the private sector sees suciently little increase in capital
relative to the increase in labor, wages fall, but it could be that a large change in capital
in the private sector causes demand for labor to rise, pushing up wages. The overall eect
depends on the relative TFP of the two sectors.
Finally, the share of capital allocated to the subsidized sector adjusts to equate the after-
subsidy returns in the two sectors. If the interest subsidy rises, capital 
ows to the subsidized
sector, reducing the marginal product of capital in that sector and increasing the marginal
product of capital in the private sector until the after-subsidy returns are equated. Thus,
the equation which governs the fraction of capital allocated to the subsidized sector is:
(1   s)APFk (K   KG;1   lG) = AGFk (KG;lG): (2.10)
82.2 Households
2.2.1 Aggregate Good
Households enjoy consumption of an aggregate good c, which is a composite of the domestic
produced good, X, and the imported good, M. Let u(c) denote the per period utility, which
we assume is strictly increasing and concave, twice-continuously dierentiable, and satises






Let XD denote the part of domestic production that is consumed domestically, and XF denote
the part of domestic production that is consumed abroad. Households use an Armington





We can interpret  as the share of domestic production consumed domestically, absent
domestic taris. The composite good can also be used for investment. Let primes denote
next period's value, and  the depreciation rate, then the aggregate resource constraint is:
YC = C + K
0   (1   )K (2.13)
Households use an ecient mix of XD and M to form the aggregate good. Let pc denote
the price of the aggregate good, pD denote the price of the good produced domestically, and
pw (1 + D) denote the domestic price of the imported good, where D is a tari and pw is
the world price, normalized to one. Hence, pc and pD are the price of the aggregate and
domestic good in terms of world goods, respectively.
Eciency requires the marginal contribution of the inputs of the aggregate good equal
11The Armington aggregator assumption is made in order to be able to match trade data. In order
to simplify the analytical derivations, we assume that the aggregator is a Cobb-Douglas function. In the
computational model, we assume the aggregator is a more realistic CES function. The results are very similar









  = 1 + D: (2.15)










We assume an exogenous foreign demand curve for domestically produced goods. Let 
denote the world tari on domestic production, then:





1  <  < 1. If foreigners also use a Cobb-Douglas Armington aggregator, the elasticity







In this section we assume capital markets are closed.12 Since capital markets are closed,
trade in goods must balance:
M = pDXF: (2.19)
2.3 Government
The government budget is balanced by including a lump sum transfer, TR. Thus the gov-
ernment budget constraint sets interest plus direct subsidies equal to lump sum taxes plus
12This is reasonable for many countries, but obviously not for all. We allowed capital markets to open in
the computational model, and the results did not change much.
10tari revenue TF  DM:
srKG + S =  TR + TF: (2.20)
It is straightforward to show that the direct subsidies equal total wage payments less the
total product of labor, that is, direct subsidies equal the total cost of the hiring constraint.
Hence:
srKG + (w   AGFh (KG;lG))lG =  TR + TF: (2.21)
2.4 Market Clearing
Market clearing requires demand for domestic goods to equal domestic production, Y :
XD + XF = Y: (2.22)




(rK + w + TR): (2.23)
2.5 Pollution
We assume emissions of a 
ow pollutant, P, is proportional to domestic production. Let 
denote the emissions intensity of output. Then:
P = GYG + PYP: (2.24)
Here YG and YP are subsidized and private production, respectively. No abatement technol-
ogy exists, so pollution falls only by reducing output or by moving production to the less
pollution intensive sector.13 Given that the private and subsidized sectors are at dierent
technology levels, it is reasonable to assume that they also have dierent pollution intensities.
13We do not include abatement as we wish to focus on the direct eect of subsidies on pollution. If
abatement was included, and if abatement increased with income, then this would only strengthen our
conclusions.
11We can write total pollution as a fraction of total output in the following way:
P = Y; (2.25)




; Y  YG + YP: (2.26)
3 Theoretical Results
To characterize the equilibrium, we substitute out for the rm and trade variables so as to
write the model as a single capital accumulation problem. Equations (2.16), (2.18), and








To nd the domestic price, we can substitute the foreign demand curve (2.18) and the
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XD =  Y; (3.3)
XF = (1    )Y; (3.4)
M = D
1  ((1    )Y )
 : (3.5)
Note that   is the share of domestic output consumed domestically, with   =  if D = 0.
Finally, substituting the demand functions into the aggregate resource constraint implies:
C + K




   
 (1    )
(1 ) D
(1 )(1 ); (3.7)
   +  (1   ): (3.8)
Here  =  and 
 =  D(1 ) if foreigners use a Cobb-Douglas Armington Aggregator. The
resource constraint (3.6) shows how foreign demand aects resources available for aggregate
consumption or investment. Note that under our maintained assumptions,  2 (0;1).
Let k denote the capital stock of an individual, then the recursive household problem is:
















We characterize the model by establishing the existence and properties of the equilibrium.
Denition 1 A Recursive Competitive Equilibrium given individual and aggregate capital
stocks k and K and government policies fF, D, s, lGg is a set of individual household deci-
sions fc, k0g, trade decisions fXD, XF, Mg, prices fr, w, pD, pcg, aggregate household de-
cisions fC, K0g, a subsidized rm input decision KG, private rm input decisions fKP, lPg,
government variables fS, TRg, and a value function v such that the household's and produc-
ers' (private and subsidized) problems are satised, all markets clear, subsidized rms earn
zero prots, the government budget constraint is satised, and the consistency conditions
(k = K implies c = C and k0 = K0) are satised.
Capital accumulation is then determined from the equilibrium rst order condition and
envelope equation:
uc (C (K;s;lG)) = vk (K
0;K
0) (3.10)




 1 r(K;s;lG) + 1   

(3.11)
C (K;s;lG) = 
Y (K;s;lG)
   K
0 + (1   )K (3.12)
13Y (K;s;lG) = APF (K   KG (K;s;lG);1   lG) + AGF (KG (K;s;lG);lG) (3.13)
Our strategy is to establish some basic properties of the competitive equilibrium, and
then use these properties to derive the more complicated results on how pollution changes
with changes in subsidies.
THEOREM 1 Suppose u and F are as described above. Then a competitive equilibrium
exists. Further, the equilibrium gross investment function K0 = H (K) is such that:
1. HK (K)  0,
2. CK (K)  0,
3. H (K) satises the Euler equation derived from (3.10) and (3.11), and
4. H (K) is concave.
All proofs are in the Appendix.
A trade agreement often consists of a combination of reductions in taris and subsidies
to domestic enterprises. In order to derive intuition on the eect of each type of government
subsidy, we consider each one in isolation. In particular, we consider a reduction in interest
subsidies leaving the labor requirement unchanged (notice that this increases the losses made
by subsidized rms and, thus, the direct subsidies), a reduction in direct subsidies, where the
labor requirement is reduced so that interest subsidies are kept constant, and a reduction in
both interest and direct subsidies (achieved through a reduction in the labor requirement).
3.1 The Eect of Reducing Interest Subsidies
Consider rst a reduction in the interest subsidy rate to rms, holding the labor requirement
xed. According to the industrial structure described above, direct subsidies must rise so
that subsidized rms continue to earn zero prots. Dierentiating the pollution accumulation
















14Equation (2.10) implies the after-subsidy marginal products are equal. Hence:











From equation (3.14), a decrease in the interest subsidy causes capital to 
ow from the more
pollution intensive government sector to the less pollution intensive private sector, reducing
pollution. However, due to the subsidy the private sector has a higher marginal product
of capital, so output rises as capital 
ows to the private sector. It follows that for overall
pollution emissions to fall, the ratio of emissions intensities must be greater than the ratio of
marginal products, which equals 1
1 s. Changes in the lump sum direct subsidy do not aect
the equilibrium allocations.
In addition to the static eect, a decrease in interest subsidies has a dynamic eect on
pollution through changes in the path of capital accumulation.
THEOREM 2 Let F and u be as described above, G > P, and suppose a decrease in s
holding lG xed. Let K0 =  K. Then:
1. The economy transitions to a new steady state
   K;   P

with lower pollution (  P <  P)
and capital (   K <  K).
If condition (3.16) holds, then in addition:
2. Investment falls:
@Kt+1
@s > 0 8t  0 and
3. pollution falls: @Pt
@s > 0 8t  0.
As shown above, if subsidized rms are suciently more pollution intensive, the capital
reallocation resulting from a decrease in the interest subsidy causes current pollution to fall.
This is the capital resource reallocation eect described above. In addition, the reduction
in interest subsidies lowers the overall return to capital, causing investment to fall. Since
15pollution is an increasing function of capital, future pollution and steady state pollution
fall as well. This is the capital accumulation eect discussed above. Because the capital
accumulation eect causes pollution to fall with subsidies regardless of pollution intensity,
the steady state condition is weaker. That is, if (3.16) is not satised but G > P, then,
following a decrease in interest subsidies, initially pollution rises but subsequently falls to a
lower steady state.
It is straightforward to interpret the capital reallocation eect in terms of the familiar










After simplifying, we obtain:
@P
@s












Hence the technique term is positive for G > P and the scale term is negative. Therefore,
a decrease in the interest subsidy rate reduces current pollution through a technique eect
and increases current pollution through a scale eect. Given condition (3.16), the technique
eect dominates and a reduction in the subsidy rate causes pollution to fall. Reducing the
interest subsidy lowers steady state output, since the increase in productivity is more than
oset by the fall in steady state capital. Hence both the technique and scale eects cause
steady state pollution to fall with subsidies, for G > P.
3.2 The Eect of Reducing Direct Subsidies
Next we consider a reduction in direct subsidies, holding the interest subsidy rate xed.
With s xed, if subsidized rms are to earn zero prots direct subsidies can be reduced
only by reducing the labor requirement. The following theorem shows that under a stronger
condition, this experiment causes pollution to fall.
THEOREM 3 Let F and u be as described above and suppose a decrease in lG holding s











8t  0 (3.19)
Then:
1. pollution falls below  P for all t  0,
2. For periods t > 1, pollution transitions monotonically to a new steady state   P <  P.
In the current period we have a labor reallocation eect: when labor moves from subsidized
to private rms, labor becomes more productive (from AGFl to w), which tends to increase
output and therefore pollution. However, since private rms are less pollution intensive,
pollution tends to fall when labor moves from subsidized to private rms. Condition (3.19)
requires the later of these two eects to be stronger. Capital also moves to the private sector,
so we have a capital reallocation eect and require condition (3.16). The intuition for (3.19)
is identical to the intuition for (3.16): both imply the reallocation of resources to the private
sector causes a decrease in pollution intensity that outweighs the increase in output.
After the initial fall in pollution, the labor requirement is xed, but a capital accumulation
eect exists, as capital converges to a new steady state. If condition (2.6) does not hold,
then capital declines monotonically to a new steady state and
1
1 s is larger than the wage
ratio. Thus given condition (3.16) and not (2.6), pollution declines to a new steady state
below the initial drop in pollution.
If condition (2.6) holds, then steady state capital may rise or fall after the reduction in
the labor requirement and the wage ratio is larger than 1
1 s. If steady state capital declines,
pollution falls further. If capital rises then pollution rises, but not by enough to oset the
initial fall in pollution. Figure (1) illustrates the time path of pollution.












17In the calibration, AG turns out to be large enough so that 1
1 s is larger than the wage ratio
and thus conditions (3.19) and (3.16) are identical.
We can also conclude that if condition (3.19) is satised, then a trade agreement which
reduces both direct and interest subsidies (and therefore relaxes the labor requirement), also
reduces pollution.
We can also break down the eect of direct subsidies into a positive technique term and
a negative scale term. Thus condition (3.19) can be interpreted as a sucient condition
for the technique eect to dominate, so that a reduction in direct subsidies reduces current
pollution.
3.3 The Eect of Reducing Taris
In the third experiment, we suppose a trade treaty requires the world to lower taris on the
exported good. Equation (2.18) implies that this is equivalent to a shift of the world demand
curve for the exported good, which increases 
.
The eect of a trade treaty which lowers world taris on pollution is then:
THEOREM 4 Let F and u be as described above and suppose an increase in 
 holding lG
and s xed. Let K0 =  K. Then:
1. There is no eect on current pollution,
2. investment rises,
3. pollution rises for t  1,
4. The economy transitions to a new steady state
   K;   P

with higher pollution (  P >  P)
and capital (   K >  K).
Note that given  (1 + D) < 1 (satised if  = 0), then an increase in domestic taris also
increases 
 and pollution. If both foreign and domestic taris fall in a trade treaty, then the
eect on 
 and therefore pollution depends on the size of the preexisting taris.
So a reduction of world trade barriers caused by the trade treaty means an increase in
foreign demand, which in turn improves the return on capital and results in an increase in
investment which in turn results in the creation of more pollution-causing factories.
18No technique eect exists here, the only eect of a change in world taris is the eect
on capital accumulation. In this sense, our results dier from the static model of Antweiler,
Copeland, and Taylor (2001). We have assumed abatement policy is constant, and thus do
not have their technique eect.
Hence a trade treaty that reduces subsidies as well as taris has an ambiguous eect
on pollution. However, we argue here (and show in the simulations for the case of China)
that overall pollution is likely to fall if (3.19) holds. The reason is that rst both foreign
and domestic taris generally fall, so the eect on 
 is ambiguous. But even if 
 rises, the
trade treaty has an ambiguous scale eect on pollution causing-capital accumulation (interest
subsidies fall but the return to capital increases with foreign demand), but an unambiguous
technique eect on pollution, caused by capital 




In this section we use a dynamic applied general equilibrium model in order to assess the
quantitative eects of changes in taris and subsidies associated with China's accession to
the WTO on pollution emissions. Our model is an extension of Bajona and Chu (2005)
where we have added pollution emissions to the private and state sectors. In order to make
quantitative predictions, the computational model adds several features not present in the
theoretical model.14 In particular, the computational model considers two nal goods, a
traded good and a non-traded good. Due to data availability, we assume that the pollution
intensity of the private and the state sector do not vary across nal goods. Some other extra
features of the computational model include adjustment costs to investment and taxes on
output. The model also features exogenous technological change in both TFP and pollution
intensity. In what follows we present the equations and a brief overview of the model. See
Bajona and Chu (2005) for the complete details.
14None of these features are critical for our qualitative analysis of the eect of subsidies to the state sector
on pollution and, therefore, the intuition from the simplied model applies to the quantitative model.












s.t. p1tc1t + p2tc2t + at+1 = wt + (1 + rt)at + TRt
at   A
at = qP1t 1kP1t + qP2t 1kP2t + qG1t 1kG1t + qG2t 1kG2t +
kP10;kP20;kG10;kG20 given (4.1)
where c1t and c2t are consumption of the traded and non-traded goods, respectively, pit is the
price of good i, and at represents the assets held by the individual. Consumers hold capital
in each sector and industry, kijt. Here qijt 1 is the return at period t of capital of type ij
invested at t   1 to be used in period t. Adjustment costs make capital sector and industry
dependent.














; i = P;G j = 1;2: (4.2)
Here Zijk is the use of good k, vjk is the quantity of good k needed to produce one unit of
good j, Y1j + Y2j = Yj, and Aij is TFP, which grows exogenously at rate (1 + 
)
1 j   1.
The production function is thus Leontief relative to both the traded and non-traded goods,
and Cobb-Douglas with respect to the capital and labor inputs. This choice of production
function, standard in the literature of applied general equilibrium models, simplies the
calibration of the parameters from the input-output tables.











1  is the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and foreign produced traded
goods, E is a technology parameter, and YC2 = Y2.






Here, ZIj represents the quantity of good j used as an intermediate input in the investment
sector. The investment good can be used in either sector to increase the sector's capital
stock. Since the change in pollution is sensitive to changes in capital stock across sectors
and over time, it is important to have a realistic model of capital adjustment. Therefore,








Kij + (1   )Kij: (4.5)













  (1   )(




; 0 <   1: (4.6)
The government obtains revenue from taxes on producers of nal goods, T, and from tari
revenue, TF. The tax rates ti and the tari rate D are exogenously given. The government
purchases per capita, Gj, are also exogenous. The government budget constraint is thus:
p1G1 + p2G2 + s
X
j
rKGj + S + TR = TF + T: (4.7)





and tari revenues are as in Section 2.3.
For trade, foreign demand is again given by (2.17), where ^ D now grows exogenously at rate

, which is consistent with the existence of a balanced growth path for the model economy.
Note that we are assuming foreign and domestic households have the same elasticity of
substitution between foreign and domestic goods.
All markets clear, so trade balances (2.19 holds) and domestic and foreign demand for
the traded good must equal supply (2.22) holds for good 1. The domestic markets for the
21non-traded good and the composite good also clear:
Gj + Cj + ZIj +
X
i;j
Zijk = YCj: (4.9)
Exogenous improvements in emissions intensity, 1









Here EI grows exogenously at rate 
, which is consistent with a stationary level of pollution
emissions.
4.2 Data and Calibration
Calibration of the economic parameters is identical to Bajona and Chu (2005) to which we
refer for explicit details. The economic parameters of the model are calibrated in order to
match data on the Chinese National Income and Product Accounts, the Chinese input-output
matrix, and the share of SOEs in Chinese industry for 1997. The values of the calibrated
parameters are reported in Table 1.
Specic to this paper is the calibration of the pollution intensity parameters. We use
the results of Wang and Jin (2002), who conducted a survey of pollution emissions of 905
industrial rms in China in 1999. They report the average pollution intensity of output, , for
four 
ow pollutants: total suspended solids (TSS), chemical oxygen demand (COD), sulfur
dioxide (SO2), and total suspended particles (TSP). Wang and Jin (2002) report pollution
emissions by type of ownership: SOEs, collective owned enterprises (COEs), Private, foreign,
and joint ventures. We categorize SOEs as subsidized rms and all other types of ownership
as private.15 The pollution intensity of private rms equals the total pollution emissions
divided by the total output of the four sectors. The parameters are reported in Table 2.
15Ideally, rms should be categorized according to whether or not they receive subsidies. This data is not
available. However, we view our assumption that only SOEs get subsidies as conservative. For example,
COEs are more pollution intensive than private rms, and probably receive some subsidies. Finally, we do
not want to use studies which compare intensity of SOEs before and after privatization, as the subsidies are
likely to be (at least in the short run) similar.
22Unfortunately, the survey was done in 1999, so our assumption is that pollution intensity
did not signicantly change between 1997 and 1999.
Emissions in Tons
per 10,000 Yuan
Firm Type TSS COD SO2 TSP
SOEs (G) 2.5 21.4 3.2 0.2
Private and Other (P) 2.00 7.29 0.08 0.02
G (1   s)   P -0.95 1.70 1.26 0.06
Table 2: Pollution intensity of SOEs and other enterprises. Derived from Table 4 of Wang
and Jin (2002). The last line uses s = 0:58, the capital-weighted average of the traded and
non-traded sectors.
5 Simulation Results
The numerical experiment is to quantitatively assess the eects on pollution emissions derived
from changes in subsidies to SOEs required for China's accession to the WTO. The initial
year for each simulation is 1997. China has been reforming its economy at least since the early
1980s, to improve economic performance and comply with trade rules and agreements. Since
it is not clear which subsidies are reduced for what reason, we focus instead on subsidies
specically targeted for elimination in the US-China WTO Bilateral Agreement (White
House 1999). The agreement, signed in 1999, gives a timetable for elimination of subsidies
of 0 to 15 years, depending on the good. We chose a ve year reform period (2000-04) since
most goods have a ve year timetable.
Although the policy changes are not fully implemented until 2004, households change
decisions beginning in 1997, in anticipation of the new policies. Changes in investment
in these early years is especially complicated. For example, suppose households know the
interest subsidy rate and therefore the future return to capital are to fall. Because of ad-
justment costs, capital created from current investment cannot be costlessly transformed
into consumption when the policy takes eect. Therefore, the return to current investment
falls. However, the incentive to reduce current investment is mitigated by households desire
for smooth consumption. Since households know future wealth and consumption will fall,
23an incentive to reduce current consumption and increase current investment exists. Since
pollution is proportional to output, pollution also changes in anticipation of the new policy
in complicated ways. Our results therefore give caution to static empirical work in this area,
since pollution is likely to vary signicantly along the dynamic path to the new balanced
growth path.
We consider ve policy experiments. The rst, which we denote the benchmark economy,
assumes the WTO agreement is not signed and future policies remain at their 1997 values. In
the other four experiments, policies change over the ve year reform period. The benchmark
economy is not in a steady state in 1997. Therefore, to isolate the eects of the changes in
subsidies, we present all results relative to the benchmark economy.
In the second experiment, the labor requirement is reduced by 25% so that direct subsides
fall by 25%. This experiment is most conservative in the assessment of the changes required
for China to enter the WTO, as it supposes only subsidies China specically agreed to
eliminate in the WTO agreement will in fact be eliminated. Of the subsidies specically
marked for elimination in the WTO agreement, most are direct subsidies. Bajona and Chu
(2005) estimate elimination of these subsidies constitutes a 25% reduction in direct subsidies.
Although interest subsidies are not specically marked for elimination, they are not allowed
and could be eliminated if another country brought suit, or if (as promised) China opens its
banking sector. The implied reduction in the labor requirement moves labor to the private
sector. The movement of labor to the private sector increases the marginal product of capital,
so capital also moves to the private sector. Both of these eects raise output, eventually
to 2.36% above the benchmark model. Since pollution is proportional to output, this scale
eect causes pollution to rise. However, the private sector is less pollution intensive, so
the movement of labor and capital to the private sector results in a technique eect which
causes pollution to fall. As shown in Figures 2-5, pollution falls relative to the benchmark
for three of four pollutants, from a small increase in TSS of 0.5% to a 22.9% decrease in SO2.
This matches the results from the theory as shown the last line of Table 2. Thus pollution
generally falls in our most conservative experiment in which no reduction in interest subsidies
exists, and for which COEs are treated as private rms.
The second experiment is an exercise which shows the eect of a 10% reduction in the
24interest subsidy rate, holding the labor requirement xed. The reduction in the subsidy
rate lowers the overall return to capital and causes existing capital to 
ow to the private
sector. The resulting fall in investment lowers steady state output relative to the benchmark
economy. The steady state scale eect therefore reduces pollution here. Production also
moves to the less pollution intensive private sector, further reducing pollution. Thus the
scale eect and technique eect both result in a decrease in steady state pollution. As shown
in Figures 2-5, steady state emissions of all four pollutants fall relative to the benchmark,
from a 0.9% fall in TSS to 27.0% fall in SO2.
The third experiment is a comparative static which shows the eect of a 10% reduction
in the interest subsidy rate, holding direct subsidies xed so that the labor requirement falls
by 13%. The fall in pollution is more moderate; output rises by only 0.01% since the lower
investment is oset by labor moving to the higher TFP private sector. Nonetheless, pollution
declines relative to the benchmark in all four cases.
The nal experiment supposes the world reduces taris to zero. This causes an increase
in demand for Chinese goods and a corresponding increase in output. As shown in Figures
2-5, pollution rises, since in this case there is no technique eect. Relative to the benchmark,
TSS increase by 0.45%, COD by 0.46%, SO2 by 0.49%, and TSP by 0.48%. The eect of
changes in taris on pollution is apparently quantitatively small relative to the eect of
changes in subsidies. Taris are small to begin with, so even eliminating taris does not
cause large changes. In contrast, our calibration indicates that SOEs receive a 58% discount
on their capital rental, so a 10% reduction in these subsidies has quantitatively large eects.
Secondly, since there is a relatively large dierence in productivity between the state owned
and private sectors, moving inputs from one sector to the other has a quantitatively large
eect on output and interest rates relative to the eect of a change foreign demand.
Figure 6 breaks down the change in pollution into scale and technique eects for all
pollutants and all experiments. As noted earlier, the technique eect is stronger where
the dierence in pollution intensity is greatest, for TSP. The scale eect is positive for the
reduction in direct subsidies and the reduction in world taris. Notice the scale eect, in
percentage terms, is independent of the pollutant.
256 Conclusions
We have given theoretical sucient conditions for which a reduction in subsidies required by
a trade agreement results in a decrease in pollution. Essentially, these conditions require the
subsidized sector to be suciently more pollution intensive than the private sector. We argue
SOEs or other rms receiving various government subsidies are likely to also receive another
kind of subsidy: lax enforcement of pollution regulations. Indeed, for the case of China,
SOEs are more pollution intensive for all four pollutants studied. Hence in our numerical
section, we show that, under the most conservative assumptions, upon entry in the WTO
pollution falls for three of four pollutants. We also show that that changes in taris have a
minimal eect on pollution relative to changes in subsidies.
Several caveats are in order. First, given that China's state owned sector comprises
about 30% of industrial output, China represents an extreme case. Still, given the evidence
weak enforcement of environmental regulations on SOEs in India and Argentina, and the
prevalence of SOEs in developing countries, our model is likely very relevant for developing
countries. Further, given that nearly all countries give some subsidies, our model will have
at least some relevance in developed economies as well. Second, subsidized rms here are
competitive. Subsidized rms may have monopoly powers. If the subsidized rm is state
owned, it may suer from agency issues. Each of these rm structures may aect pollution.
Finally, our model has only one traded good and may thus miss intra-sectoral eects of
lowering taris.16
Exogenous subsidies here are the outcome of the political process. Modeling this process
is a subject of future research. Regardless of the political process, a free trade agreement,
by creating new winners and losers, has the possibility of altering the political equilibrium.
The trade agreement thus can potentially reduce pollution-causing subsidies in a way that
a privatization may not. If the political equilibrium is unchanged, privatization is unlikely
to produce signicant changes.
In eect we have found a new channel for which economic policy aects pollution, a tech-
16For example if a particular good was pollution intensive and had high world taris, then the eect of
tari reductions on pollution may be more signicant than what we obtain here.
26nique eect that results when production moves from a more pollution intensive subsidized
rm to a less pollution intensive private rm. This technique eect could be examined in
many other contexts. For example, countries with low subsides are both richer and have
a cleaner environment, thus our model would likely reproduce the environmental Kuznets
curve. Our model could also be used to examine the eects of privatization on pollution.
These are subjects of future research.
7 Appendix: Proof of theorems
7.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Substituting the interest rate (2.4), wage rate (2.5), and transfer (2.21) into the budget
constraint for the aggregate good (3.6) and simplifying results in:
c + k




Y (K;s) + APFk (K   KG (K;s);1   lG)(k   K)
#
+ (1   )k (7.2)
Y (K;s)  APF (K   KG (K;s);1   lG) + AGF (KG (K;s);lG) (7.3)
The model is now in the framework of Greenwood and Human (1995). By repeatedly
appealing to (2.10), and the properties of the interest rate (2.8) and the share of capital in
the subsidized sector (2.7), we can verify assumptions (i)-(iii) of Greenwood and Human.
It follow from their proposition on page 615 that an equilibrium exists.
Further, equation (3) of Greenwood and Human states that the equilibrium investment
function H is the xed point a recursive non-linear functional equation. The xed point of
this equation is the Euler equation. Hence H satises the Euler equation.
Equation (4) of Greenwood and Human states that H has the following properties:
0  HK (K)  G1 (K;K) + G2 (K;K) (7.4)
270 < H (K) < G(K;K) (7.5)
Equation (7.4) implies that c(K) is increasing in K. Thus since u is concave, for all K,
K0:
(uc (c(K))   uc (c(K
0)))(K   K
0)  0: (7.6)
Substituting in the Euler equation, we see that K0 > K if and only if K <  K. Thus H is
concave. Thus H has the properties stated in Theorem 1.
7.2 Proof of Theorem 2
As shown in the text, condition (3.16) implies a decrease in the subsidy decreases pollution.
For the steady state, let  = 1
1+, where  is the rate of time preference. Evaluating




























is decreasing in  K, the right hand side is de-
creasing in  K. Hence a decrease in the subsidy implies a decrease in  K. It is straightforward,
but tedious, to verify that  P is increasing in s given G > P, using (7.7).
For periods between 0 and the steady state, note that from Theorem 1, H (K) is strictly
increasing and concave in K. Hence, K will converge monotonically to   K from above, since
K0 >   K. Given that pollution is increasing in the capital stock, pollution will also converge
monotonically from above to   P.
7.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Dierentiating pollution with respect to lG, holding K xed, we see that current pollution
falls given condition (3.19). In addition, dierentiating the steady state pollution with
respect to lG implies that steady state pollution falls given in addition condition (2.6). Let
28P0 <  P denote the new pollution emissions in the initial period.
For periods between 0 and the steady state, if capital is increasing, then pollution will
increase monotonically to the new steady state P0 <   P <  P. If capital is decreasing, then
pollution will decline to the new steady state   P < P0. The reasoning is identical to Theorem
2.
7.4 Proof of Theorem 4
Current pollution is a function of only the current capital stock, tax rates, and lG, all of
which are given. Hence current pollution is independent of 
. For the steady state, note
that modied golden rule (7.7) for this economy implies that if 
 rises then so does steady
state capital. Since steady state pollution is increasing in the steady state capital stock for
G > P, steady state pollution rises.
For periods between 0 and the steady state, capital and pollution will increase monoton-
ically to the new steady state, using identical reasoning as in Theorem 2.
8 Appendix: Tables and Figures
29Parameter Symbol Value Matches:
Production Parameters Traded Non-Traded
Capital Share  0.24 0.38 (a)
Productivity, Private Sector APj;0 5.29 2.97 (a)
Productivity, SOEs AGj;0 2.45 2.65 (a)
Unit Cost, traded v1j 0.54 0.11 Input-Output Tables (I/O)
Unit Cost, not-traded v1j 0.37 0.19 I/O
Growth rate, GDP 
 0.02 US Trend
Armington Aggregator
Technology Parameter E 1.67 Equilibrium
Elasticity Parameter  0.5 AGE Literature
Share Parameter  0.72 I/O, Equilibrium
Investment Parameters
Capital Share  0.38 I/O
Productivity AI 1.94 Equilibrium
Depreciation  0.08 Investment Data
Adjustment Costs Parameter  0.9 US I=K Volatility
Preference Parameters
Discount Rate  0.95 One year period
Elasticity Parameter  -1.00 within RBC range
Share of traded good  0.87 I/O
Foreign Demand ^ D0 0.44 I/O
Policy Parameters Traded Non-Traded
Production Tax t 0.12 0.08 (a)
Government Consumption Gj 0.00 0.21 I/O
Rental rate subsidy s 0.82 0.15 (a)
Labor Restriction lGj 0.19 0.18 (a)
Domestic Tari D 0.02 Tiwari, et. al. (2002)
Foreign Tari F 0.05 Tiwari, et. al. (2002)
Initial Values Traded Non-Traded
Initial Private Capital KPi0 0.65 0.52 K series
Initial Government Capital KGi0 0.96 0.56 K series
Foreign Borrowing B0 0.00 I/O, K series
Table 1: Economic parameter values. (a): jointly calibrated to match output and labor
inputs from input-output tables (I/O), the constructed capital stock by ownership in 1997,
the share of output in each industry produced by SOEs in 1997, share of output in the
traded industry produced by SOEs in 1997, the direct subsidies to GDP ratio for 1997, and
the assumption of equal capital shares in the private and state sectors. Here j indexes the
type of good (traded and non-traded). These parameter values are identical to Bajona and
















Effect of a decrease in direct subsidies on pollution, varying productivity differentials
(3.19) holds
Figure 1: Changes in pollution resulting from a decrease in direct subsidies over time as a
function of SOE productivity, given condition (3.19) holds.




























TSS as a percentage of the benchmark economy
S: −25%, l*: −25%
s: −10%, l*: fixed
s: −10%, l*: −13%
t
F ® 0
Figure 2: Total Suspended Solids relative to benchmark economy with no changes in taris
and subsidies. Changes in taris and subsidies are phased in over years 2000-2004.































COD as a percentage of the benchmark economy
S: −25%, l*: −25%
s: −10%, l*: fixed
s: −10%, l*: −13%
t
F ® 0
Figure 3: Chemical oxygen demand relative to benchmark economy with no changes in taris
and subsidies. Changes in taris and subsidies are phased in over years 2000-2004.


























2 as a percentage of the benchmark economy
S: −25%, l*: −25%
s: −10%, l*: fixed
s: −10%, l*: −13%
t
F ® 0
Figure 4: Sulfur Dioxide Emissions relative to benchmark economy with no changes in taris
and subsidies. Changes in taris and subsidies are phased in over years 2000-2004.






























TSP as a percentage of the benchmark economy
S: −25%, l*: −25%
s: −10%, l*: fixed
s: −10%, l*: −13%
t
F ® 0
Figure 5: Total suspended particulates relative to benchmark economy with no changes in
taris and subsidies. Changes in taris and subsidies are phased in over years 2000-2004.




















































Figure 6: Decomposition of steady state change in pollution relative to the benchmark
economy into scale and technique eects.
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